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Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and its propaganda actions targeting Germany have re-
sulted in an increase in German society’s distrust of Russia and to more assertive political 
reactions. They have also translated into unprecedented, increased support for eastern allies 
within NATO. Posing as an architect of the peace process in Ukraine, Germany has indirectly 
become a hostage to the success of this process (or the lack of it). However, the involvement 
of both Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in working 
out and implementing the Minsk agreement has not brought the results Berlin had expected. 
This has amplified Germany’s disappointment with both Russia and Ukraine. However, with-
drawing from this involvement would scarcely be imaginable due to the significant political 
capital invested in these actions so far. Hence the attempts to save face and the efforts to en-
sure the implementation of the agreement, as well as the temptation to devise its subsequent 
variants (which would be increasingly less favourable for Ukraine). 
The German debate on the sanctions imposed on Russia is becoming an element of domestic po-
litics as shaped by the campaign preceding the autumn 2017 elections to the Bundestag. Unlike 
Chancellor Merkel, in this campaign the SPD is trying to play the role of “a party of peace” seeking 
rapprochement with Russia, regardless of the fiasco of the present version of Willy Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik. The intention to prevent conflict escalation should sanctions be tightened and the 
related attempt to force the implementation of the Minsk agreement result from both the lack 
of consensus over this matter within the ruling coalition and the conviction that it is necessary to 
maintain dialogue with Russia and simultaneously develop NATO’s defence capability. 
The rising disenchantment with Russia
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its 
aggression in the Donbas have triggered an 
acceleration and advancement of the shift in 
Germany’s thinking about Russia. Once Germa-
ny’s strategic partner, Russia has now become 
its strategic problem. The beginning of this 
shift dates back to the period of disappoint-
ment with Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency and 
to Vladimir Putin taking the office of Russian 
President in 2012 for the third time. When the 
Russian-Ukrainian war broke out, Germany’s 
approach towards finding a resolution to this 
conflict was based on the principle of ‘strategic 
patience’ towards Russian aggression and on 
the assumption that Europe is fated to coope-
rate with Russia and the welfare and security 
of the continent are possible only in coopera-
tion with Russia and not against it or without 
it. This attitude was the result of a clash of two 
concepts for Germany’s approach towards Rus-
sia. The first assumes that Russia is Germany’s 
strategic partner, indispensable for maintaining 
stability in Europe, and that good relations with 
Russia are worth the concessions on the part 
of the West. The other assumes that Russia is 
a state with a significant potential for destruc-
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tive actions (as exemplified by the annexation 
of Crimea, the aggression towards Ukraine and 
the military intervention in Syria) and that for 
Germany it is merely one of its significant part-
ners, excluding the EU and the USA (similar to 
China and Turkey, for instance), but not the 
most significant one1. The division does not al-
ways run along the lines of specific party mem-
bership. It can be stated, however, that the first 
approach, which makes reference to Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik, is more popular with Social Demo-
crats, post-Communist Left and Alternative for 
Germany (AfD), while the other – with Christian 
Democrats and the Greens. 
The exacerbation of the domestic dispute over 
Germany’s relations with Russia is also connec-
ted with the ongoing German campaign ahead 
of the 2017 Bundestag elections. Foreign poli-
cy (mainly the approach towards Russia; policy 
towards the USA, including the TTIP issue; the 
future of the EU) has become one of the major 
fields of dispute between the coalition mem-
bers (CDU/CSU and SPD), who otherwise have 
a similar platform in numerous other areas. 
Similar to the remaining portion of the politi-
cal elite, business circles and society, Chancellor 
Merkel would like to achieve a normalisation of 
relations with Russia as soon as possible. She 
supports the idea of dialogue combined with 
the strengthening of NATO’s own defence ca-
pabilities. This was evident when she consen-
ted to the strengthening of NATO’s eastern 
1 Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, Konrad Popławski, ‘The 
German reaction to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict – 
shock and disbelief’, OSW Commentary, 3 April 2014, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen-
tary/2014-04-03/german-reaction-to-russian-ukrainian-
conflict-shock-and
flank and to extending the economic sanctions 
against Russia in June 2016. At the same time, 
Merkel signalled Germany’s readiness to gra-
dually lift the sanctions, should Russia imple-
ment at least a portion of the Minsk agreement 
(hence the increasingly frequent suggestions 
that the Minsk settlements should be modified 
and a new version of the agreement, Minsk III, 
should be adopted)2. However, this intention is 
increasingly less likely to be put into practice 
due to Russia’s military intervention in Syria, 
including the air strikes on Aleppo, which co-
nvinced Merkel to support the plan to impose 
additional sanctions on Moscow. 
The Social Democrats for their part consider 
the subsequent dialogue offers, such as those 
involving arms control, more valuable than the 
plan to create an effective deterrence mecha-
nism within NATO. In their opinion, lifting the 
sanctions would be a priority. Recently, the SPD 
has toughened its stance and begun to criticise 
NATO exercises which Steinmeier referred to as 
“sabre-rattling”3. This was also evident during 
his visit to Yekaterinburg in August 2016, when 
he gave a “fundamental” (as he called it) speech 
in which he compared the annexation of Cri-
mea with the Western intervention in Libya 
and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. By doing 
so, he de facto echoed Russian propaganda. In 
his speech he also remarked that the destroyed 
2 In a commentary published by the WirtschaftsWoche 
weekly, Florian Willershausen argues that the peace pro-
cess needs to be revived and this would be possible only 
after renewed negotiations on the Minsk agreement. Aside 
from emphasising need to formulate a ‘Minsk III’, the au-
thor also claims that specific provisions should be adopted 
in relation to Ukraine, if the latter wants to receive further 
aid from Europe. See Die Ukraine braucht ein neues Frie-
densabkommen, http://www.wiwo.de/politik/ausland/
sanktionen-gegen-russland-die-ukraine-braucht-ein-neue
s-friedensabkommen/13708328.html New terms of the re-
vised agreement, more favourable for Ukraine (for example 
the inclusion of the USA in the Normandy format), were 
formulated by: H. Kostanyan, S. Meister, Ukraine, Russia 
and the EU: Breaking the deadlock in the Minsk process, 
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/ukraine-russia-and-eu-
breaking-deadlock-minsk-process
3 Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier on relations be-
tween NATO and Russia, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.
de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2016/160619_
BM_Bild_am_Sonntag_engl_version.html
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and 
its aggression in the Donbas have triggered 
an acceleration and advancement of the 
shift in Germany’s thinking about Russia.
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Syrian cities, including Aleppo (though failing 
to mention that Russia was among the forces 
that destroyed them), should be rebuilt by Ger-
mans “hand in hand” with Russians4. Similarly, 
the strong objection by the Social Democrats 
to imposing additional sanctions in response 
to Russia’s intervention in Syria is intended to 
emphasise the SPD’s profile as “a party of pe-
ace and dialogue”. The policy pursued by the 
SPD is the outcome of the party’s low approval 
rating (around 20%), its search for issues to be 
discussed during the campaign ahead of the 
Bundestag elections (including the intention to 
take advantage of the polarisation of opinions 
within society on what the most appropriate 
policy towards Russia should be), its efforts 
to regain the support of ordinary party mem-
bers (who usually tend to support Russia) and 
its response to the pro-Russian orientation of 
the AfD. It also stems from the heritage of Ost-
politik as the only successful project in foreign 
policy to be attributed to this party. However, 
within the ranks of the SPD disparate voices can 
also be heard which object to the policy of rap-
prochement with Moscow5. 
4 Rede von Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier an 
der Ural Federal University Jekaterinburg, https://
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Re-
den/2016/160815_BM_Jekaterinburg.html
5 The founders of the group which is critical of Russia in-
clude second line activists, for example historian Jan C. 
Behrends, lawyer Martin Luithle and entrepreneur Joa-
chim Schaller. Cf SPD-Mitglieder gründen Arbeitskreis 
Genge Gabriels Ostpolitik, Zeit Online, http://www.
zeit.de/politik/2016-05/russland-sanktionen-spd-gabri-
el-ostpolitik-arbeitskreis, The party leadership tried to 
block the process of the official launch of the task force 
operating within the party: See SPD vertritt nur noch 
Kreml-Positionen, http://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/
ausland/eu/id_78187150/martin-luithle-spd-vertritt-zu-
nehmend-nur-noch-kreml-positionen-.html
In the debate over the policy towards Russia and 
the effectiveness of the sanctions, both the co-
alition party CSU and the opposition party Greens 
argue that the economic sanctions are effective 
and that it would be premature to lift them (al-
though members of these two parties are not 
unanimous on this issue, e.g. the CSU leader Horst 
Seehofer has long proposed reducing the sanc-
tions). A similar stance adopted by a large portion 
of Christian Democrats and the Greens towards 
cooperation with Russia is interesting in the con-
text of possible coalitions which would likely be 
formed after the Bundestag elections. Any futu-
re coalition made up of these parties may cause 
the future government to abandon the SPD-pro-
moted paradigm of unavoidable cooperation in 
Germany’s relations with Russia. Meanwhile, in 
the opinion of the biggest opposition grouping, 
the Left, and the extra-parliamentary AfD party, 
the sanctions are an ineffective instrument which 
harms the German economy. 
No holds barred
At the beginning of 2016 Germany changed its 
perception of the threats posed by Russian propa-
ganda. Until then, the German government ten-
ded to assume that what was at stake in the infor-
mation warfare with Russia was Germany’s moral 
supremacy and that this warfare posed no real 
threat to the institutions of the state and to public 
order. In February 2015, at the Munich Security 
Conference, Angela Merkel spoke about Russia’s 
advantage in propaganda terms and Germany’s 
Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen said that 
the enemy’s “destructive narrative” should be re-
vealed. Despite this, when asked about its strate-
gy to counteract Russian influence in the media, 
Germany’s foreign ministry replied that “pluralism 
and media freedom” are the best remedy for ma-
nipulation6. At present, Germany argues that Rus-
6 Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 1. Februar 
2016 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung, 
p. 16, 5 February 2016, http://dip21.bundestag.de/
dip21/btd/18/074/1807473.pdf
The exacerbation of the domestic dispute 
over Germany’s relations with Russia is con-
nected with the ongoing German campaign 
ahead of the 2017 Bundestag elections.
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sia is able to use its propaganda to destabilise the 
situation within the country and one of its goals 
is to oust Chancellor Merkel from power. Accor-
ding to the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (BfV) and the ministry of the interior, 
biased reporting on the events in Germany offe-
red by the German language versions of the news 
portals Russia Today and Sputnik News is inten-
ded as revenge for the stance adopted by the Ger-
man government on the sanctions against Russia. 
Fallacious information spread by the above-men-
tioned portals regarding Germany, the migration 
crisis and the functioning of the German state 
(the so-called Lisa case) has inspired the so-called 
late repatriates (i.e. ethnic Germans repatriated to 
Germany from the former Soviet republics after 
1990) to hold numerous rallies. In all, over around 
two weeks in January and February 2016, more 
than 12,000 repatriates across Germany attended 
protests against the government’s policy towards 
the migration crisis and against immigrants (the 
total number of repatriates living in Germany 
is estimated at 2.5 million). The incitement of 
a community which hitherto had been passive co-
nvinced the German leadership that Russia is able 
to exert a genuine destabilising influence on the 
domestic situation in Germany 7.
As a consequence, the German Federal Chan-
cellery ordered the Federal Intelligence Service 
(BND) and the Federal Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution (BfV) to find out whether 
these disinformation campaigns had been plot-
ted by state structures of the Russian Federation 
and whether this activity forms part of a more 
7 Experten: Putin will Merkel stürzen, 10 March 2016, 
http://de.euronews.com/2016/03/10/experten-pu-
tin-will-merkel-stuerzen
comprehensive operation aimed at fuelling the 
hostility between the German citizens and immi-
grants. The German leadership fear the influence 
of Russian propaganda on the electoral campaign 
and the results of the 2017 elections. In its report 
published in July 2016, the research centre SWP 
(Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – an analytical 
institute providing advice to the German Federal 
Chancellery) indicated that Russia may try to de-
stabilise the pre-election campaign and mobilise 
extremist groups against Germany’s constitutio-
nal order8. Cyberattacks staged by Russia targe-
ting, for example, German politicians are another 
threat. In 2015, a cyberattack was launched at the 
Bundestag (the perpetrators managed to inter-
cept the passwords used by the administrator of 
the entire computer system used by parliament), 
and at the beginning of 2016 another attack tar-
geted the CDU headquarters in Berlin. A cyberat-
tack organised in August 2016 targeted certain 
parliamentary groupings (SPD and the Left Party), 
members of parliament and local branches of spe-
cific parties, including the CDU branch in Saarland 
(election to local parliament will be held there on 
26 March 2017) and the CDU’s youth organisation 
– Junge Union. These actions intensified after the 
outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine9.
Regardless of whether BND and BfV will mana-
ge to find conclusive evidence to prove direct 
involvement of the Kremlin in the defamatory 
campaign against Germany, the very fact of or-
dering such an investigation, publicising this in 
the media and the comments offered by public 
officials and politicians constitute a warning 
8 S. Fischer, M. Klein (eds.), Denkbare Überraschungen. 
Elf Entwicklungen, die Russlands Außenpolitik nehmen 
könnte, SWP-Studie, July 2016, http://www.swp-berlin.
org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2016S15_fhs_
kle.pdf#page=20
9 According to experts quoted by Süddeutsche Zeitung, re-
sponsibility for the recent attack can be attributed to Rus-
sian hackers from the apt28 group (or Sofacy) acting on 
commission from Russian services. This was also confirmed 
by Arne Schönbohm, head of the German Federal Office 
for Information Security. Cf A. Ciechanowicz, Rosyjskie 
cyberataki na Niemcy, Analizy OSW, 28 September 2016, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2016-09-28/
rosyjskie-cyberataki-na-niemcy
Germany argues that Russia is able to use 
its propaganda to destabilise the situation 
in the country and one of its goals is to 
oust Chancellor Merkel from power.
5OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 225
sign for Russia, its supporters in Germany (the 
so-called Russlandversteher or those who un-
derstand Russia) and anti-immigrant parties 
and movements. At the same time, it should be 
noted that the suspicion that foreign intelligen-
ce may have inspired the actions by anti-immi-
grant movements is not being used by the Ger-
man government in its domestic political fight. 
Such accusations involving the right-wing AfD 
party are extremely rare10. 
The change of the German government’s ap-
proach has inspired German media to frequ-
ently discuss the issue of information warfare. 
In the long term, the presence of the negative 
image of Russia in the media (including regular 
references to Soviet Russia and the Cold War) 
may trigger a desire to review pro-Russian atti-
tudes, while at present it serves to boost socie-
ty’s support for maintaining the sanctions.
The economy first?
Regardless of the awareness of the threats posed 
by Russia and the present sanctions, economic 
contacts continue to be a very important element 
of Germany’s policy towards Russia and are in-
tended to accelerate the normalisation in Berlin’s 
relations with Moscow. Despite Russia’s declining 
significance for the German economy (see Appen-
dix), in the second half of 2015 the economic dia-
logue became intensified. This was possible due 
to the temporary stabilisation of the situation in 
Ukraine and to Germany focusing on the issue of 
10 Kiesewetter klagt Kreml-Chef Putin an, 3 February 2016, 
https://www.gmuender-tagespost.de/account /log-
in/?aid=864880
refugees, among other things. Under the com-
bined auspices of the ministries of the economy 
in both countries a German-Russian platform for 
entrepreneurs was launched (its first meeting was 
held in Moscow on 22 October 2015) and two vi-
sits by Germany’s minister of the economy and 
energy, Sigmar Gabriel, to Moscow were organi-
sed (on 28 October 2015 and 21–22 September 
2016). Moreover, in November 2015 German and 
Russian members of parliament met in Moscow 
under the newly formed energy task force (for-
mally an extra-parliamentary body). The task for-
ce is headed by Peter Ramsauer (CSU), chairman 
of the Bundestag’s Economic Affairs and Energy 
Committee11. One of the main discussion topics 
was the Nord Stream 2 project. Germany treats 
this project as a business undertaking that does 
not violate the sanctions and is in line with Eu-
ropean energy policy12. At the same time, Ger-
many granted political support to this project, 
for example, when Gabriel discussed its elements 
with President Vladimir Putin and Gazprom’s CEO 
Alexei Miller during his visit to Moscow in October 
2015. All this suggests that the project is of major 
significance for German politics13. 
11 The proposal to form this group was put forward back 
in 2012. Cf Streit um Sanktionen: Grüne boykottie-
ren Energie-AG mit Russland, http://www.spiegel.de/
wirtschaft/soziales/russland-gruene-verweigern-arbe-
itsgruppe-mit-der-duma-a-1068426.html and Es geht 
ums Erdgas: Deutsche Nebenaußenpolitik in Russland 
und der Einfluss der Konzerne, http://www.dieterjan-
ecek.de/de/article/200.es-geht-ums-erdgas-deutsche-
nebenau%C3%9Fenpolitik-in-russland-und-der-ein-
fluss-der-konzerne.html
12 During a press conference with the President of Lithu-
ania, Chancellor Merkel emphasised the significance of 
European energy security and the business-oriented na-
ture of the project. See Pressekonferenz von Bundeskan-
zlerin Merkel und der Präsidentin der Republik Litauen, 
Dalia Grybauskaitė, 20 April 2016, https://www.bundes-
regierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen
/2016/04/2016-04-20-bkin-litauen-grybauskaite.html
13 This was mentioned for example by Vice Chancellor 
Gabriel, who emphasised that the project is in Germa-
ny’s interest. Gabriel verteidigt Russland-Pipeline, FAZ, 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspoli-
tik /nord-stream-2-gabriel-verteidigt-russland-pipe-
line-13975022.html Equally significant are Gabriel’s sug-
gestions that NS2 should be excluded from European 
jurisdiction to thereby limit the possible external influ-
ence on the project. Cf EU prüft Opal-Pipeline von Gaz-
prom, http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/internation-
al/5011626/EU-pruft-OpalPipeline-von-Gazprom
Economic contacts continue to be a very 
important element of Germany’s policy 
towards Russia and are intended to ac-
celerate the normalisation in Berlin’s re-
lations with Moscow.
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At present, no debate is being held in Germany 
over the plan to tighten gas cooperation with 
Russia and the consequences of the potential 
construction of Nord Stream 2 for Germany’s 
partners in Central and Eastern Europe. There 
is consensus, dating back to the beginnings of 
Ostpolitik, that raw materials-oriented coope-
ration with Russia leads to mutual economic 
benefits and to an improvement in political 
relations. The few voices objecting to the idea 
emphasise the question of increased gas depen-
dence on Russia, the fact of disregarding the in-
terests of Central and Eastern European states, 
Ukraine in particular (despite the German go-
vernment’s declared support for Kyiv involving 
the construction of the second branch of the 
pipeline, Ukraine may lose EUR 1.8 billion which 
it presently earns on the transit of gas), and 
threats to the implementation of Germany’s cli-
mate policy goals (because the project provides 
for increased use of gas instead of energy gene-
rated from renewable sources)14. The most im-
portant criticism was contained in the letter by 
Manfred Weber, the chairman of the European 
People’s Party in the European Parliament and 
member of the CSU, CDU’s coalition partner in 
the German government, to European Com-
mission Vice President and to Germany’s Vice 
Chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel. In his letter Weber 
opposed the pipeline’s construction15. Despite 
14 Grüne gegen Nord Stream 2, Drucksache 18/8401, 
https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/201605/-/422780
15 Top German MEP joins foes of controversial Nord Stream 
2 pipeline, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ba24e8ac-0e27-
11e6-ad80-67655613c2d6.html The most prominent crit-
ics of Nord Stream 2 include MEPs from the Christian Dem-
ocrat group (for example Norbert Röttgen, Bernd Fabritius, 
Christoph Bergner, Michael Fuchs) and the Greens. 
legal doubts16 and the objection voiced by the 
states of Central and Eastern Europe and some 
EU Commissioners, it is likely that the new 
branch of the pipeline will be built because this 
is in Germany’s interest (Germany will be able 
to play the role of Europe’s gas hub).
Lobbying organisations are important actors in 
German-Russian relations; despite Russia’s an-
nexation of Crimea and its actions in eastern 
Ukraine, they failed to significantly review their 
approach. These organisations include the Ger-
man-Russian Forum headed by Matthias Platzeck, 
former Prime Minister of Brandenburg. Its mana-
gement board members include several former 
diplomats such as Ernst-Jörg von Studnitz and 
Andreas Meyer-Landrut. Despite the sanctions, 
the Forum continues to actively support the plan 
to increase Russia’s involvement in cooperation 
with Germany. This involves intensified dialogue 
with Moscow, the lifting of sanctions, increased 
economic cooperation, joint participation in re-
solving international conflicts and a fundamen-
tal change in Germany’s thinking about Russia17. 
In the other important German-Russian forum, 
the Petersburg Dialogue, a change of leadership 
was effected under pressure from the German 
Federal Chancellery. The former Prime Minister 
of the German Democratic Republic Lothar de 
Maizière, a proponent of the closest possible 
relations with Russia, was replaced with Ronald 
Pofalla, a close collaborator of Angela Merkel and 
former head of the German Federal Chancelle-
ry, who is more critical of Moscow. At present, 
efforts are underway to devise a new coopera-
tion format for this forum. The first meeting of 
the Petersburg Dialogue under new leadership 
was held in Saint Petersburg, in July 2016, for 
the first time since 2012. Similarly, some rese-
arch centres, including SWP, are lobbying for the 
16 Sz. Kardaś, R. Bajczuk, Antymonopolowe problemy 
projektu Nord Stream 2, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/
publikacje/analizy/2016-08-24/antymonopolowe-prob-
lemy-projektu-nord-stream-2
17 M. Platzeck, New rapprochement with Russia. Why is it in 
our interest and what can we do to support it?, http://russ-
landkontrovers.de/wiederannaeherung-an-russland/
Since the annexation of Crimea, Germans 
have continued to show their lack of con-
fidence in Russia, although they less fre-
quently point to Russia as a military threat.
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development of energy relations with Russia18.
Germany’s federal states are involved in lobbying 
for increased cooperation with Russia. Examples 
include Bavaria (the stronghold of the CSU, a ruling 
coalition party) and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
(this state hosts the Russia Day, co-financed by the 
Nord Stream consortium). Both federal states nur-
ture very intensive economic contacts with Russia 
in spite of the relatively insignificant value of their 
exports. In 2015, Bavaria exported to Russia goods 
worth EUR 2.5 billion, which represent a decrease 
of one third as compared with 2014; at the same 
time Russia was ranked 15th on the list of export 
destinations recorded for this federal state19. 
In the case of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Rus-
sia’s share in its exports was more significant, 
particularly when taking into account the eco-
nomic weakness of this federal state (Russia was 
ranked 4th and accounted for EUR 717 million; in 
2014 the value of exports was EUR 1.07 billion). 
Additionally, around a hundred companies from 
this federal state are doing business with Russian 
companies20. The visits by the Prime Ministers 
18 In December 2015, SWP published a text intended to initi-
ate the reconstruction of economic relations between the 
European Union and Russia by way of carrying out projects 
in the field of energy (aside from gas, also including re-
newable sources of energy, energy efficiency and innova-
tive technologies) and refraining from discussing the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian conflict. The text can be considered a reply 
to the criticism offered in relation to the Nord Stream 2 
project and an expression of support for its implementa-
tion. Regardless of the present political conflicts, the pro-
posal involving development of cooperation in the field of 
energy is identical to declarations by German energy en-
terprises (Uniper, formerly E.ON) and chemical companies 
(BASF) which invest in Russian gas fields and are interest-
ed in maintaining cooperation with Russia on favourable 
terms; https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/
products/research_papers/2015RP08_gsv_wep.pdf
19 In 2015, Poland was ranked ninth on the list of states to which 
Bavaria exports its goods (the survey comprised the period 
from January till September 2015); http://www.stmwi.ba 
yern.de /f i leadmin/user_upload/stmwivt /Publika-
tionen/2015/2015_11_26_Aussenhandelsreport_2015-09.pdf
20 Beziehungen des Landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern zu 
Russland, http://www.regierung-mv.de/static/Regierungs 
portal/Ministerpräsident%20und%20Staatskanzlei/Dateien/
pdf-Dokumente/Russlandtag2016_Faktenblatt%20(002).
pdf Another example is North-Rhine Westphalia which 
in 2014 exported to Russia goods worth EUR 4.4 billion 
(a drop of 20% versus 2013). Despite this, the actions carried 
out by this federal state do not undermine the official policy 
pursued by the federal government regarding the sanctions. 
of certain federal states (Thuringia, Bavaria) to 
Moscow, their meetings with President Putin and 
their demands that sanctions should be lifted (the 
Prime Ministers of Saxony, Hamburg, Mecklen-
burg-Vorpommern) are intended to help improve 
the economic position of these states in their re-
lations with Russia and to facilitate the process of 
proceeding to a more comprehensive format of 
cooperation with Moscow, de facto disregarding 
the changes resulting from Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and its involvement in the war in Ukraine. 
The durable decline of confidence  
in Russia 
Both the actions of Russian propaganda in Ger-
many and the attempts to maintain good eco-
nomic relations with Russia do not translate into 
an improvement of how German society views 
Russia. Since the annexation of Crimea, Germans 
have continued to show their lack of confidence 
in Russia (64% of Germans view Russia as an 
unreliable partner; a survey by Bertelsmann Sti-
ftung and ISP, Partnerschaft unter Spannung, 
April 201621), although fewer respondents than 
before see Russia as a military threat (56% are 
not afraid the military threat posed by Moscow) 
and they do not consider it necessary to build 
permanent bases in Central and Eastern Euro-
pe (67% of the respondents oppose this idea; 
a Politbarometer survey commissioned by ZDF, 
July 2016)22. The respondents are aware of the 
poor condition of German-Russian relations 
and fear that these may continue to deteriorate 
as a result of present developments. The Ger-
mans largely support the policy towards Russia 
21 The latest and at the same time the most comprehensive 
research regarding the German public opinion’s attitude 
towards Russia and its aggression against Ukraine was 
conducted in April 2016. See Partnerschaft unter Span-
nung. Wie die Deutschen über Russland denken, https://
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/publikationen/pub-
likation/did/partnerschaft-unter-spannung/
22 Deutsche sehen Verstärkung der Nato-Truppen in Osteu-
ropa skeptisch, https://www.welt.de/newsticker/news1/
article156895601/Umfragen-Deutsche-sehen-Vers-
taerkung-der-Nato-Truppen-in-Osteuropa-skeptisch.html
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as pursued so far by Chancellor Merkel (and the 
EU) (44% of them support the policy pursued by 
the government; 25% argue that the coalition’s 
policy is too strict). At the same time, support 
for maintaining the sanctions imposed on Rus-
sia has not been unanimous. On the one hand, 
62% of Germans support the plan to maintain 
the sanctions (46% of the respondents are for 
continuing them in their present form, 16% wo-
uld like the sanctions to be tightened and 27% 
are against the sanctions). On the other hand, 
69% of the respondents would rather see a re-
sumption of economic cooperation instead of 
continuation of the sanctions (Russland in Eu-
ropa, TNS Infratest, March 2016)23. Low public 
support for the plan to lift the sanctions and the 
simultaneous consent for expanding economic 
cooperation are convenient for some of the po-
litical parties. They enable these parties to sup-
port deeper economic cooperation regardless 
of the sanctions, and at the same time to avoid 
the risk of losing the voters’ trust. Regardless of 
the disillusionment with Russia’s policy towards 
Syria (66% of the respondents assess Russia’s 
involvement in Syria negatively), the Germans 
continue to argue that at present the question 
of resolving this conflict is the most important 
task in bilateral relations (this view is supported 
by 49% of the respondents; the resolution of 
the conflict in eastern Ukraine is indicated by 
13% of them)24. 
Summary
Neither the shock caused by Moscow’s attack 
on Ukraine, nor the present impatience and di-
sappointment with the Kremlin’s approach to 
implementing the Minsk agreement, combined 
with awareness of the threat posed by Russian 
propaganda, have impacted on the process of 
23 Russland in Europa: Annäherung oder Abschottung? 
https://www.koerber-stiftung.de/internationale-ver-
staendigung/im-fokus-russland-in-europa/publika-
tionen.html
24 Ibidem.
devising new concepts for the policy towards 
Russia. It should be emphasised that German 
Social Democrats are the only political group to 
continue to believe in a direct continuation of 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik, and actions by representa-
tives of the remaining political options are me-
rely reactive. 
The toughening of the SPD’s pro-Russian rhe-
toric and the efforts to undermine the policy 
towards Russia pursued by the government so 
far are connected with the launch of the cam-
paign in Germany ahead of the elections to the 
Bundestag to be held in the autumn of 2017. 
The Social Democrats’ approval rating, the lo-
west in many years, combined with the weak 
position of the party’s leader, force the party to 
emphasise its uniqueness. One of the few areas 
for manifesting how this party differs from the 
Christian Democrats is the policy towards Rus-
sia (the two parties are unanimous on a large 
number of other issues). At the same time, the 
SPD is trying to limit the flow of its voters to 
the AfD and to win supporters from the Left, 
with which it may want to form a governing 
coalition after the elections.
The German government has become impatient 
with the lack of progress in implementing the 
Minsk agreement. At the same time, it opposes 
the idea of exerting greater pressure on Ukra-
ine to ensure the implementation of its part of 
the commitments and to possibly impose new 
sanctions on Russia for its failure to implement 
the deal. Berlin is aware that the deal’s fiasco 
will be tantamount to a drop in Germany’s 
credibility. This is why voices are increasingly 
heard in Germany suggesting that the Minsk 
agreement should be modified. In this way 
Germany would maintain the appearance that 
the peace process is progressing, which in turn 
would enable the first sanctions to be lifted in 
2017. This would foster the normalisation in 
Germany’s relations with Russia, much desired 
by all German politicians.
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APPENDIX
Chart 1. The value of Germany’s exports 
  to Russia and to Poland in 2012 and 2015 
Source: Ranking of Germany’s trading partners in Foreign Trade, www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvi-
ronment/ForeignTrade/TradingPartners/Tables/OrderRankGermanyTradingPartners.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
Chart 2. Russia’s share  
  in Germany’s exports in 2013–2015
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